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COMPETING INTERESTS: ANTI-PIRACY
EFFORTS TRIUMPH UNDER TRIPS BUT
NEW COPYING TECHNOLOGY
UNDERMINES THE SUCCESS
I. INTRODUCTION
The practice of recording music and then selling those
recordings for a profit, without the musicians' permission, has
been a major problem pervading the music industry for de-
cades. In fact, losses stemming from music piracy are currently
estimated as costing "the $12 billion U.S. recording industry
nearly $300 million annually."' Moreover, the bootleg business
in unauthorized recordings of the band 'Grateful Dead' manag-
es alone to exceed the GNP of France.2 Certain countries in
particular have caused the recording industry a major head-
ache by retaining either outdated or insufficient copyright
laws, and also turning a blind eye to their nation's booming
pirate music market.3 By copying sound recordings or live
performances of a musician without his or her consent, bootleg-
gers and pirates all over the world have trampled on the fun-
damental rights of performing artists to regulate the use, dis-
tribution, and profits of their own performances.
The 1994 Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellec-
tual Property Rights (TRIPS), which was part of the revisions
to the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade4 (GATT), at-
1. Lauren Wiley, Bootleggers Turning to Burning: RIAA says CD-R Piracy is
on the Rise, EMEDIA PROF., June 1, 1998, available in 1998 WL 9595630.
2. See Douglas McLennan, Copyright Under the Gun From Digital Age Pi-
rates, SEATI'LE POST-INTELLIGENCER, Apr. 27, 1998, available in 1998 WL 4292264.
3. See generally Jerry D. Brown, U.S. Copyright Law After GATT: Why a
New Chapter Eleven Means Bankruptcy for Bootleggers, 16 LOY. L.A. ENT. L.J. 1,
9-15 (1995). Brown analyzes particular regions across the globe and finds that
Asia in particular had bootleg percentage rates almost double that of other inter-
national regions. See id. at 9. Another commentator similarly considers Asia a
problem region, describing booming markets in China, Hong Kong, Taiwan, Korea,
Malaysia, Phillippines, Indonesia, and Thailand. See Linda W. Tai, Music Piracy in
the Pacific Rim: Applying a Regional Approach Towards the Enforcement Problem
of International Conventions, 16 LOY. L.A. ENT. L.J. 159, 163-168 (1995).
4. Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, Apr.
15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex
1C, LEGAL INSTRUMENTS-RESULTS OF THE URUGUAY ROUND vol. 31; 33 I.L.M.
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tempted to change these problems and promote artists' rights
by including both an anti-bootlegging provision, and a provi-
sion protecting music producers. Article 14 of TRIPS provides
artists with the right to prevent "the fixation of their unfixed
performance"5 (i.e., recording a concert) and also to "prohibit
the direct or indirect reproduction of their phonograms" (i.e.,
duplicating a compact disc (CD) or cassette tape). In order to
comply with these copyright infringement provisions, countries
traditionally well-known for producing vast amounts of pirate
cassette tapes and CDs have slowly begun to amend their laws
in the years following TRIPS.
Pursuant to TRIPS, the copyright systems in countries
notorious for producing a high volume of pirate CDs have be-
come stricter with respect to their anti-bootleg provisions.7
Although this outcome is quite promising because it suggests
that efforts to abolish piracy are prevailing, in reality, current
developments in sound technology are boosting the pirate CD
market.8 It is unlikely that any country will sacrifice the devel-
opment of new technology simply because that type of tech-
nology may result in future infringements of artists' copy-
rights. Rather, these new developments will make it exceed-
ingly more difficult for countries to enforce anti-bootlegging
and anti-piracy laws. This Note analyzes these two competing
interests and theorizes that, in light of the Audio Home Re-
cording Act of 1992,' it is unlikely that new CD technology
will be regulated in the future. Thus, TRIPS may have won
this battle, but piracy is likely to win the war.
Part II of this Note will define piracy, and provide exam-
ples of the effect of the piracy market on the world-wide re-
cording industry. Part II will also detail the historic interna-
tional conventions which influenced the anti-bootleg clause in
TRIPS, such as the Berne Convention for the Protection of
Literary and Artistic Works (Berne Convention),0 the Univer-
1197 (1994) [hereinafter TRIPS].
5. Id. art. 14(1).
6. Id. art. 14(2).
7. See discussion infra Part IV.B.
8. See generally Wiley, supra note 1.
9. Audio Home Recording Act of 1992, 17 U.S.C. § 1008 (1992).
10. Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works, Sept.
9, 1886, revised in Stockholm, July 14, 1967, 331 U.N.T.S. 217, amended in Paris,
July 24, 1971, 828 U.N.T.S. 221 [hereinafter Berne Convention].
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sal Copyright Convention," and the International Convention
for the Protection of Performers, Producers of Phonograms, and
Broadcasting Organizations 2 (Rome Convention). Inadequa-
cies of these multilateral conventions, and also the emerging
economic implications of trade in intellectual property during
the 1980's, prompted the development of TRIPS to rectify the
previous deficiencies in these treaties and protect intellectual
property rights in international trade.
Part III of this Note will summarize Article 14, the section
of TRIPS entitled "Performers' Rights," which prohibits boot-
legs, counterfeits, and pirated sound recordings. Part III will
also include a discussion of how Article 14 of TRIPS has im-
pacted the recording industry, and whether it has succeeded in
reaching its goal of diminishing pirated works in the interna-
tional trade market.
Part IV will focus primarily on China, a country infamous
for producing bootleg music. 3 China's attempts to reconcile its
copyright laws with the provisions set forth in TRIPS are firm
evidence that the international arena is committed to battling
the piracy epidemic. Although China has been faced with many
obstacles, it is diligently trying to amend its current laws and
affirm its international obligations, putting a positive spin on
the piracy issue." This section will also summarize prior prob-
lems with copyright infringement, and lax or non-existent
bootleg clauses in Chinese law. China's slow-moving, yet prom-
ising attempts at lowering its rate of bootleg production will
also be analyzed. Finally, this section will focus on the 1995
and 1996 bilateral trade agreements with the United States,1 5
which illustrate examples of China's stepped-up efforts to re-
spect intellectual property rights.
11. Universal Copyright Convention, Sept. 6, 1952, 6 U.S.T. 2731, 216
U.N.T.S. 132, Paris revision, July 24, 1971, 25 U.S.T. 1341, 943 U.N.T.S. 178
[hereinafter UCCI.
12. International Convention for the Protection of Performers, Producers of
Phonograms and Broadcasting Organisations, Oct. 26, 1961, 496 U.N.T.S. 43 [here-
inafter Rome Convention].
13. See Tai, supra note 3, at 163 (naming China "the world's largest pirate
market").
14. See discussion infra Part IV.B-C.
15. Agreement Regarding Intellectual Property Rights, Feb. 26, 1995, China-
U.S., 34 I.L.M. 881 [hereinafter 1995 IPR Agreement]; Statement by Acting USTR
Charlene Barshefsky on Trade Talks with China on Intellectual Property Rights, 13
INT'L TRADE REP. (BNA) 1036 (June 19, 1996) [hereinafter 1996 IPR Agreement].
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Part V of this Note will describe the impacts of emerging
digital home recording technology on the bootleg industry, and
the increase in bootleg production that these new devices have
created. CD-Recorder (CD-R) drives, CD-Recordable discs, and
CD-Rewritable (CD-RW) discs are evidence of the recent tech-
nological advances in the sound recording industry. This sec-
tion will analyze the conflict between allowing average, law-
abiding people to use CD-R drives to record their favorite
songs onto a CD-R in their own home, and permitting money-
making bootleggers to abuse the technology by breaking the
law. 6 This Note will demonstrate that the advent of the CD-R
will likely thwart foreign governments, such as China, from
continuing down the path toward effectively eliminating boot-
legs from the market.
II. CONCERNS FOR PIRAcY LEVELS IN THE INTERNATIONAL
ARENA CULMINATED IN TRIPS
A. What Exactly is Piracy?
There has been significant divergence among scholarly
opinions within the world of copyright law concerning the exact
definitions of piracy, bootlegging, and counterfeiting. 7 The
following analysis of legal opinions demonstrates that each
category of copyright infringement seems to overlap one anoth-
er. One commentator even refers to the categories as "inter-
changeable" as they mesh together, and he also blames fellow
legal scholars' and commentators' incorrect usage of the terms
for this interchangeability. 8 Despite their specific differences,
most broad conclusions describing piracy are similar. One
general definition, specifically including the issue of profit-
making, poses piracy in a narrower light as "stealing the re-
sults of other people's mental labour-intellectual property in
order to reap colossal profits." 9
16. See generally Wiley, supra note 1.
17. See, e.g., Brown, supra note 3, at 4 (providing elaborate definitions and
helpful examples in order to clarify the current state of confusion concerning the
definitions of copyright infringement categories).
18. Todd D. Patterson, The Uruguay Round's Anti-Bootlegging Prouision: A
Victory For Musical Artists and Record Companies, 15 WiS. INT'L L.J. 371, 379
(1997).
19. Shen Rengan, Combat Piracy and Safeguard the Rights and Interests of
Authors, CHINA PAT. & TRADEMARKS, Oct. 1994, at 5.
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Some American authors have analyzed the matter in great
depth and developed even more specific, narrower definitions
for each category of infringement. According to Jerry D. Brown,
there are three categories of copyright infringement with re-
spect to music." These categories (counterfeiting, piracy, and
classic bootlegging) fall underneath the umbrella term of "boot-
legging."2' Counterfeiting, according to Brown, "is the unau-
thorized duplication or sale of a pre-existing copyrighted
work,"22 whereas piracy is the "unauthorized duplication or
sale of a copyrighted work that was not released to the pub-
lic,"' such as a song rehearsed in a recording studio that was
not included on the released album. Brown further distinguish-
es classic bootlegging as the "unauthorized copy of a live per-
formance of a copyrighted work,"24 such as the illegal tape-
recording of a concert.
Brown's theories on the categories of music infringement
contrast sharply with the opinions of David Schwartz, another
commentator, who broadly defines a bootleg as any copy of
music otherwise before unavailable to the public, either in the
form of a live concert or other performance.' Schwartz's defini-
tion of bootlegging seems to coincide more with Brown's ac-
count of a pirated work, while still incorporating Brown's idea
that a classic bootleg's source is a live performance.26
Yet another approach to defining music infringement was
set forth by the United States Supreme Court in Dowling v.
United States,27 which stated that:
A "bootleg" phonorecord is one which contains an unautho-
rized copy of a commercially unreleased performance. As in
this case, the bootleg material may come from various sourc-
es. For example, fans may record concert performances, mo-
tion picture soundtracks, or television appearances. Outsiders
may obtain copies of "outtakes," those portions of the tapes
20. Brown, supra note 3, at 4.
21. Id. (dubbing the categories as the "three classes of bootlegging").
22. Id.
23. Id.
24. Id.
25. David Schwartz, Note, Strange Fixation: Bootleg Sound Recordings Enjoy
the Benefits of Improving Technology, 47 FED. COMM. L.J. 611, 613 (1995).
26. Id. See also Brown, supra note 3, at 4.
27. Dowling v. United States, 473 U.S. 207, 209 n.2 (1985) (describing and
defining categories of bootlegged works).
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recorded in the studio but not included in the "master," that
is, the final edited version slated for release after transcrip-
tion to phonorecords or commercial tapes .... Though the
terms frequently are used interchangeably, a "bootleg" record
is not the same as a "pirated" one, the latter being an unau-
thorized copy of a performance already commercially re-
leased.28
The definition that the Supreme Court provides in Dowling
incorporates both Brown and Schwartz's ideas that a bootleg's
source may be a live performance, such as a concert. However,
the Dowling opinion, by defining a pirated work as one already
released, contradicts Brown's theory that a pirated work must
be previously unreleased.
The Recording Industry Association of America (RIAA), a
not-for-profit organization which represents artists, record
companies, producers, and manufacturers of almost 90% of the
United States' sound recordings, 9 creates another wrinkle in
the issue of determining the definition of piracy. The RIAA has
developed an anti-piracy unit which brings civil actions against
infringers on behalf of its members to recover losses resulting
from piracy. As a result of this expertise in the realm of music-
related copyright infringement, the RIAA has developed its
own conclusions regarding piracy. First, as a threshold classifi-
cation, the RIAA describes piracy loosely as "the illegal dupli-
cation and distribution of sound recordings," and then further
explains that it "takes three specific forms: counterfeit, pirate
and bootleg.""0 Counterfeits, according to the RIAA, are dupli-
cates of music already released to the public, in an attempt to
look exactly like the original copy.3 Pirated works are dupli-
cates of "only the sounds of one or more legitimate recordings,"
without the artist's permission. 2 For instance, pirated works
can take the form of a compilation, such as a "Greatest Hits"
album, derived from a number of selected songs on various pre-
released albums. In contrast, pirated works are not exact du-
28. Id.
29. Anti-Piracy Press Kit, (visited Oct. 14, 1998) <http'l/wvw.riaa.com/anti-
pir/releases/presskit.htm#tfop> [hereinafter Anti-Piracy Press Kit].
30. Id.
31. Id.
32. Id.
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plicates of one specific album, as in the case of a counterfeit
work. A bootleg, according to the RIAA, differs from the two
other forms of piracy in that it is the recording of an artist's
live performance without his or her consent, and also without
regard to whether the performance has been previously re-
leased or not.3"
The only clarification that an overview of these industry-
related and scholarly opinions provides is that there is no
standard set of rules regarding copyright music infringement
definitions. It is helpful to note that the RIAA's definitions
coincide directly with the Supreme Court's interpretation of
piracy in Dowling. However, the RIAA conclusions, although
persuasive, are not legal definitions. Also, the Supreme Court
decision in Dowling, although legally binding in the United
States, has no impact on the international community as a
whole.
Perhaps the broadest definition of piracy is found in
TRIPS itself. In Article 51, TRIPS explains that:
"pirated copyright goods" shall mean any goods which are
copies made without the consent of the right holder or person
duly authorized by the right holder in the country of produc-
tion and which are made directly or indirectly from an article
where the making of that copy would have constituted an in-
fringement of a copyright or a related right under the law of
the country of importation.34
Although the wording is lengthy, the meaning is obvious. Un-
der the definition provided in Article 51 of TRIPS, any unau-
thorized copying constitutes piracy, and is thus illegal. The
TRIPS definition does not speak directly to the related issues
of counterfeiting or bootlegs, but rather lumps all unauthorized
copies together as "pirated goods." Accordingly, for its broad
inclusion of all "pirated" subject matter, its consistency with
the RIAA's threshold definition of piracy, and its relevancy
within the international community, the definition of piracy in
TRIPS will be employed throughout the remainder of this
Note. Thus, any copy or recording of an artist's music without
33. Id.
34. TRIPS, supra note 4, art. 51 n.14(b).
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his or her permission will be referred to in this Note generally
as a "pirated" good.
B. The Effects of Piracy: Recent Statistics
Although piracy has not yet been completely extinguished,
there have been notable improvements since the 1980's. In-
deed, the music industry has come a long way from that de-
cade when pirated works, bootlegs, and counterfeit cassettes
and albums were readily available. In 1983, one commentator
even dubbed music piracy the "crisis gripping the American
music industry."35 Thankfully, the backdrop has changed for
the better. According to the RIAA, in 1997 the approximate
losses to all recording industries on the international level as a
whole was roughly five billion dollars, while the United States'
recording industry alone sustained losses amounting to nearly
three hundred million dollars. 6 Although these figures appear
staggering, surprisingly, they reflect significant improvement
with certain forms of pirated recordings. For instance, the
RIAA, in its 1997 Anti-Piracy Statistics, reported an 80% de-
crease in cassette piracy throughout the last five years, and a
62% decrease in 1997 in particular.17 The total confiscation of
CDs decreased in 1997,"8 and specifically, the confiscation of
bootlegs decreased exceptionally in the six months between the
RIAA's 1997 Year-End Anti-Piracy Statistics and its 1998 Mid-
Year Anti-Piracy Statistics. 9
However, even in light of the substantial accomplishments
of 1997 in the battle against piracy, CD piracy is rebounding
and gaining strength from the advent of a new device called
the CD-Recordable.4 ° As explained by the RIAA, the CD-R is a
home recording machine, which costs around four hundred dol-
35. Frank L. Fine, Record Piracy and Modern Problems of Innocent Copyright
Infringement, 8 ART & L. 69, 70 (1983). See also Marshall Leaffer, Protecting Unit-
ed States Intellectual Property Abroad: Towards a New Multilateralism, 76 IOWA L.
REV. 273, 298 (1991) (discussing the dollar losses to piracy prior to 1991).
36. See Anti-Piracy Press Kit, supra note 29, para. 1.
37. See RECORDING INDUSTRY ASSOCIATION OF AMERICA, 1997 ANNUAL REPORT
35 (1998) [hereinafter RIAA 1997 ANN. REP.].
38. Id.
39. RIAA Releases Mid-Year Anti-Piracy Statistics (visited Oct. 14, 1998)
<http'//www.riaa.com/antipir/releasesapmid98.htm> [hereinafter 1998 Mid-Year
Statistics].
40. See RIAA 1997 ANN. REP., supra note 37.
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lars, and can easily copy music and other sounds onto blank
CDs for as little as one dollar. 41 Steve D'Onofrio, RIAA Execu-
tive Vice President and Director of Anti-piracy, has commented
that "piracy in this format [CD-R] is proving to be the next big
boom."42 As a result of the looming threat of CD-R technology,
the RIAA directed 80% of its anti-piracy campaign budget in
1997 to battle newly-developed forms of CD technology arising
in the pirate market.43
With the introduction of new CD technology, the promising
efforts at eradicating pirate CDs and CD-Rs in previous years
seemed to wane, and unfortunately piracy is once again thriv-
ing." CD-Rs first appeared on the market in 1997.4" That
year, there were 442 bootleg, pirate, or counterfeit CD-Rs
seized.46 The figure rose drastically to 103,971 seizures in
1998.4' Additionally, in regards to pirate CDs generally, there
was an astounding increase of 163% from 1997 to 1998,48 even
after the promising decreases experienced up to that point. In
1998, there was an overall figure of 338,458 counterfeit and
pirate CDs seized.49
Efforts to battle piracy are perhaps at their strongest ever.
Nevertheless, upon surveying the recording industry's statis-
tics on revenue losses to piracy, it is quite apparent that art-
ists, record companies, and producers still suffer from inade-
quate copyright protections. In the wake of new sound record-
ing technology, the future may become even more bleak for
41. See id. (providing background on the rise of CD-Rs, and the economic
benefit of its use to pirates).
42. 1998 Mid-Year Statistics, supra note 39.
43. See RIAA Releases Year-End Anti-Piracy Statistics (visited Oct. 14, 1998)
<http:/www.riaa.com/antipir/releases/apyr97.htm> [hereinafter 1997 Year-End Sta-
tistics]; Bill Holland, RIAA Piracy Stats Show New-Tech Threat; On-Line Dangers
Looming Large, As Cassette Concerns Lessen, BILLBOARD, Mar. 21, 1998, at 5,
available in 1998 WL 10913103.
44. See generally 1997 Year-End Statistics, supra note 43 (explaining that,
although certain improvements have occurred in the past five years, "music piracy
is rapidly moving towards the Internet and CD piracy").
45. See RIAA 1997 ANN. REP., supra note 37, at 35; 1997 Year-End Statistics,
supra note 43.
46. See RIAA Releases Yearend Anti-Piracy Statistics (visited May 20, 1999)
<http/iv/www.riaa.com/piracy/press/040699.htm> [hereinafter 1998 Year-End Statis-
tics].
47. Id.
48. Id.
49. Id.
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copyright holders. These developments in home recording tech-
nology are accompanied with justifiable concerns that the de-
vices will be used for illegal and infringing purposes. Reconcil-
ing the recent trend in current technology with international
efforts to quash the pirate market is a difficult, and perhaps
impossible, task. Hopefully, TRIPS' role in this dilemma will
serve to keep anti-piracy efforts at the forefront of the issue,
rather than allowing pirates to hide behind the mask of home
recording rights.
C. Inadequate International Conventions in the Area of
Copyright Law Prior to TRIPS
The most powerful treaty regarding copyright, prior to
TRIPS, was the Berne Convention for the Protection of Liter-
ary and Artistic Works," "the first multilateral treaty for inter-
national copyright law,"5' first established in 1886. The Berne
Convention set up minimum standards of copyright protection
for all its member nations, and concentrated on three major
principles: 2 national treatment,53 abolition of formalities,54 and
minimum substantive standards for duration and scope.5 It
also provided that "[a]uthors of literary and artistic works...
have the exclusive right of authorizing the reproduction of
these works, in any manner or form,"5 perhaps alluding to a
musician's right to preclude others from recording his songs or
performances without his consent.
The Berne Convention, however, was largely insufficient in
the realm of piracy. First, its focus was centered primarily on
literary and artistic works, as opposed to performances.57 Sec-
ond, no protection was given to producers of sound recordings
because that particular medium was not included as a 'literary
50. Berne Convention, supra note 10.
51. Tai, supra note 3, at 168.
52. See generally JOHN GURNSEY, COPYRIGHT THEFT 27-28 (1995) (discussing
the focus of the Berne Convention, and summarizing its main principles).
53. See Berne Convention, supra note 10, art. 5(3). See generally Tai, supra
note 3, at 169 (explaining "that foreign works should enjoy, in each member coun-
try, the same protection given works of that member country's nationals").
54. See Berne Convention, supra note 10, art. 5(2). See generally MARSHALL
LEAFFER, UNDERSTANDING COPYRIGHT LAW 377, 380 (2d ed. 1995) (discussing the
provisions of the Berne Convention relating to formalities).
55. See Berne Convention, supra note 10, art. 2(1).
56. Id. art. 9(1).
57. See id. art. 2 (defining "literary and artistic works").
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and artistic work."" Third, pirating countries simply did not
honor their obligations and responsibilities under the conven-
tion, and neglected to amend their own laws accordingly. 9
Finally, while the Berne Convention focused extensively on na-
tional treatment,0 it overlooked necessary enforcement mecha-
nisms, and also "did not create transnational rights for intel-
lectual property."6' Consequently, trade distortions and copy-
right infringement prevailed under the provisions of the Berne
Convention.62
Another multilateral treaty, the Universal Copyright Con-
vention,63 established in 1952, was an agreement attractive for
countries that were reluctant to abolish their formality re-
quirements. The fundamental difference between the Berne
Convention and the Universal Copyright Convention is that
the latter allowed its signatories to retain certain formali-
ties.' Otherwise, the Universal Copyright Convention, which
"was intended to work in parallel with the Berne Conven-
tion,"65 contained similar provisions such as the standard of
national treatment.6 Nevertheless, the Universal Copyright
Convention was deemed a weak convention by commentators,
largely due to its acceptance of countries with insufficient copy-
right protection as members, and the fact that copyright reme-
dies are limited to those provided by the country where the
copyright was granted.67
Another concern arising from both the Berne Convention
and the Universal Copyright Convention stemmed from the
concessions they allowed for developing countries. Both of
58. Note the absence of sound recordings from the definition of "literary and
artistic works" in the Berne Convention. Id. art. 2(1). See also Tai, supra note 3,
at 169.
59. See Tai, supra note 3, at 170. See also Leaffer, supra note 35, at 294
(describing the effects of non-compliance).
60. Berne Convention, supra note 10, art. 5(3).
61. Tai, supra note 3, at 170.
62. See GURNSEY, supra note 52, at 29 (describing international conventions on
the whole as ineffective, and as indirectly promoting piracy).
63. UCC, supra note 11.
64. Id. art. 111(2).
65. Daphne Yong-d'Herv6, Pre-TRIPS International Legal Framework; TRIPS
Structure, in INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND INTERNATIONAL TRADE: A GUIDE TO THE
URUGUAY ROUND TRIPS AGREEMENT 8-9 (International Chamber of Commerce ed.,
1996).
66. See UCC, supra note 11, art. II.
67. See Tai, supra note 3, at 171.
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these conventions made efforts to include the concerns of coun-
tries with growing and emerging economies, in the sense that
they encouraged the enactment of copyright protection legisla-
tion in those countries.68 However, this practice was met with
criticism. Providing developing countries with concessions in
order to increase the information access in those countries,
although a notable concern, only resulted in a forum wherein
piracy was indirectly encouraged to expand.69
Another multilateral treaty, called the International Con-
vention on the Protection of Performers, Producers of
Phonograms and Broadcast Organizations," arose in 1961.
This treaty, popularly known as the Rome Convention, broad-
ened the scope of rights granted in the Berne Convention to
include musicians, record companies, and broadcast media.
Focusing closely on the protection of performing artists' rights,
the Rome Convention included provisions providing a perform-
er and producer with the possibility of preventing "the fixation,
without their consent, of [his] unfixed performance,"7 and the
direct or indirect reproduction of his phonogram."2 However,
despite its achievements, the Rome Convention has been criti-
cized by the United States (which is not a signatory) because
"[t]he United States believed that the minimum standards of
the Rome Convention inadequately protected American sound
recording copyright owners."73
The revenue lost to piracy and other related intellectual
property rights infringements made it clear that a more effec-
tive solution to the piracy crisis was necessary. 4 The problem
had grown to such enormous proportions that it became impos-
68. For example, Tai notes that one of the main goals of the UCC was to
obtain "the widest number of adherents." Id. This goal necessitated lax require-
ments and resulted in acceptance (as members) of developing countries with inade-
quate domestic copyright legislation. Id. Additionally, Gurnsey explains that both
the Berne Convention and the UCC were aimed at "encouraging and facilitating
the creation and enforcement of appropriate copyright laws," presumably in coun-
tries where copyright laws had not previously existed. GURNSEY, supra note 52, at
29.
69. See GURNSEY, supra note 52, at 29.
70. Rome Convention, supra note 12.
71. Id. art. 7(1)(b).
72. Id. art. 10.
73. Brown, supra note 3, at 44.
74. See generally Leaffer, supra note 35 (discussing profits lost to the piracy
problem and the decision to form a multinational solution).
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sible to attempt a solution by using separate domestic anti-
bootlegging statutes, bilateral treaties, or even comprehensive
treaties such as the Berne Convention.75 A broad multination-
al solution became necessary to tackle the pervasive problem,
and to establish uniform protection.76 The existing internation-
al conventions, namely the Berne Convention and the Univer-
sal Copyright Convention, only provided a loose framework for
intellectual property rights, but neglected to offer significant
protection to artists.7  Thus the United States pushed for the
development of a single multilateral convention, as opposed to
a scattered number of bilateral treaties as done in the past.
78
D. Trade-Related Issues Demanded a Stronger International
Framework
The driving focus of TRIPS was concern for the resolution
of problems inherent in the link between intellectual property,
its value, and international trade.79 As numerous commenta-
tors note, the "inadequate protection of intellectual property
undermines the goal of free trade because it leads to trade dis-
tortions."" Without adequate rights and corresponding
protections, an artist's incentive to create decreases rapidly.
Pirates of intellectual property "enjoy lower production costs
and are in a better position than legitimate producers to satis-
fy demands"8' in their respective countries. Modern technolo-
gy makes the process of copying, or otherwise infringing upon
75. See discussion infra Part II.C.
76. See LEAFFER, supra note 54, at 394-395.
77. See Yong-d'Herv6, supra note 65, at 10.
78. See Rebecca F. Martin, Note, The Digital Performance Right in the Sound
Recordings Act of 1995: Can It Protect U.S. Sound Recording Copyright Owners in
a Global Market?, 14 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 733, 760 (1996); WILLIAM F.
PATRY, COPYRIGHT AND THE GATT: AN INTERPRETATION AND LEGISLATIVE HISTORY
OF THE URUGUAY ROUND AGREEMENTS ACT- 1995 SUPPLEMENT TO COPYRIGHT LAW
AND PRACTICE 2 (1995).
79. See Tai, supra note 3, at 172-173.
80. LEAFFER, supra note 54, at 395. See also Yong-d'Herv6, supra note 65, at
10; Lynne Saylor & John Beton, Why the TRIPS Agreement?, in INTELLECTUAL
PROPERTY & INTERNATIONAL TRADE: A GUIDE TO THE URUGUAY ROUND TRIPS,
AGREEMENT 12 (International Chamber of Commerce ed., 1996); INTERNATIONAL
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW 274 (Anthony D'Amato & Doris Estelle Long eds.,
1997) [hereinafter D'Amato & Long]; Martin, supra note 78, at 760 (analyzing the
effects inadequate copyright regimes have on trade relations, and resulting trade
distortions).
81. See Leaffer, supra note 35, at 282.
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intellectual property, a relatively simple task.82 While this
makes life easier for copyright pirates, it puts a colossal strain
on artists. They have practically no incentive to invest their
time, energy, research, and development tactics into a project
which is not likely to succeed economically or to be adequately
protected by intellectual property rights enforcement.83 Artists
simply cannot make a profit with an abundance of inexpensive
bootlegs flooding the market." Thus, the practice of piracy has
almost no risks and abundant rewards for pirates.85 This tug-
of-war between artists and pirates results in decreased produc-
tion of legitimate works, less overall world trade, and resulting
trade distortions. 6
Another fundamental premise considered during the devel-
opment of TRIPS was that economic development would be
negatively impacted by inadequate protection of intellectual
property rights.87 The piracy crisis which prompted the inclu-
sion of TRIPS's Article 14 anti-bootlegging and sound recording
provisions is proof of this sort of negative impact resulting
from insufficient legislative protections. In developed countries
like the United States that strongly supported the enactment
of TRIPS, intellectual property rights are policed in large part
because "industrialized countries are attempting to protect an
increasingly important component of the national wealth."88
Similarly, the economic growth of developing countries was
also a concern in the international arena prior to the enact-
ment of TRIPS, in the sense that piracy affected trade with
those developing countries.89 It is a common practice for devel-
82. For an example of current technology and the ease with which it can be
employed, see Mark Alpert, Soundtracks: You Now Have More Options Than Ever
Before to Make High-Quality Recordings at Home, POPULAR MECHANICS, Feb. 1,
1997, at 50.
83. See D'Amato & Long, supra note 80, at 269.
84. See generally Tai, supra note 3, at 159 (providing background for the
rising costs of intellectual property creation, and subsequent discouragement of
further creations).
85. See Leaffer, supra note 35, at 282.
86. Id. at 277.
87. The United States thought that GATT would be the appropriate forum to
address intellectual property protection, due to the notion that inadequate intellec-
tual property rights in some countries had "defined economic effects" on world
trade. Tai, supra note 3, at 172-173.
88. D'Amato & Long, supra note 80, at 12.
89. Commentators have noted that "lack of foreign investment" in the pirating
developing countries was hindering their efforts at economic development. See id.
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oped countries to measure the impact of piracy in developing
countries by the effect it has on Western markets." However,
piracy takes its toll within developing countries as well. Some
countries have expressed concern over their "cultural depen-
dence" on Western countries for artistic material.9' Also, such
easy access to pirated versions of intellectual property decreas-
es the incentive to engage in trade with the countries that
produce the legitimate goods (usually developed countries).
Consequently, producing unauthorized copies of intellectual
property may have resulted in "trade barriers on the import of
lawfully manufactured goods from the pirating countries."92
The countries owning rights to the legitimate goods often be-
came reluctant to further invest in the pirating countries,93
which resulted in increased production of pirated goods in
order to overcome the resulting economic deficit of the devel-
oping countries. This cycle impeded international trade and
hindered the economic growth of developing countries. The
framing of intellectual property rights as a trade-related issue
sought to remedy these inconsistencies in international trade
and economic growth.
Additionally, many developing countries did not, and still
do not, fully comprehend the concept of copyright.94 In fact,
copyright protection in some countries is a completely alien
concept.95 This misunderstanding results in problems with
copyright legislation enactment and enforcement in these coun-
tries.96 Developed countries, such as the United States, re-
spond to the economic injuries they suffer from pirates by
using forceful retaliatory measures such as threats of trade
sanctions.97 In order to avoid this unwanted form of retalia-
tion, pirating countries hurriedly enforce copyright protections
to appease the complaining countries.98 Countries that do not
90. See GURNSEY, supra note 52, at 30.
91. Id. at 30-31.
92. D'Amato & Long, supra note 80, at 12.
93. Id.
94. See discussion infra Part VA.L
95. See GURNSEY, supra note 52, at 31.
96. Gurnsey notes that in developing countries which have no copyright sys-
tems, "copyright is introduced with no real understanding of its aims and objec-
tives," and thus the resulting copyright systems produce "some very odd results."
Id.
97. See infra notes 101-11 and accompanying text.
98. See discussion infra Part IV.A (describing China's acquiescence as mere
459
BROOK. J. INTL L.
fully appreciate copyright protections in general will project
their inadequate understanding of the law into their own copy-
right system's development, culminating in inadequate sys-
tems.9 This circular concept repeatedly results in trade sanc-
tions and threats of trade wars against the pirating coun-
tries.10
0
One typical trade-related retaliatory measure used by the
United States against countries that do not respect intellectual
property rights is the "Section 301" provisions in the Trade Act
of 1974. ' 0' Under Section 301, a country that is technically in
compliance with TRIPS may still be found to adhere to unfair
and inadequate intellectual property protections.' 2 Section 301
grants the United States Trade Representative (USTR) the
authority to take action when she believes that "an act, policy,
or practice of a foreign country" in some way "denies benefits
to the United States under any trade agreement," or simply
"restricts United States commerce." 3 The USTR, in her annu-
al Special 301 reviews, designates problem countries under a
set of categories. ' ' The most severe category, the "priority for-
eign country," is one which has the most "egregious" or "oner-
ous" policies in regards to intellectual property protection.0 '
The next category, the "priority watch list," is reserved for
countries without adequate intellectual property protection
who nevertheless are not as severe offenders as the priority
foreign countries.' 6 The "watch list" category designates "coun-
tries considered to provide better IPR protection than those in
the other two categories, but which the USTR feels still need
to be monitored.""' If the USTR makes an affirmative determi-
attempts to avert a trade war).
99. See GURNSEY, supra note 52, at 31.
100. See discussion infra Part IV.A (using China as an example).
101. Trade Act of 1974, 19 U.S.C. §§ 2411-2420 (1998) fhereinafter Section
301].
102. See USTR Launches Attack on Greece, Cites Other Countries in Special
301 Report, WORLD INTELL. PROP. REP., June 1998, at 188, 195 (outlining the Spe-
cial 301 process).
103. Section 301, supra note 101, § 2411(a)(1).
104. Trade Act of 1974, 19 U.S.C. § 2242 (1998) [hereinafter Special 301].
105. See, e.g., USTR Launches Attack on Greece, Cites Other Countries in Spe-
cial 301 Report, supra note 102, at 188, 195; Intellectual Property Protection: 1998
USTR Special 301 Decisions, E. ASIAN ExEcUTIVE REP., Mar. 15, 1998, at 8 [here-
inafter Special 301 Decisions].
106. See Special 301 Decisions, supra note 105, at 8, 20.
107. Id. at 8.
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nation under one of the aforementioned categories, she may
impose duties, enter into binding agreements, or suspend or
withdraw benefits to that country."8
Motivated by these concerns for the promotion of research
and development, the incentive to create, and also the leveling
of trade distortions, the United States pushed to place TRIPS
on the agenda of the Uruguay Round (the multilateral trade
negotiations aimed at revising the General Agreements on
Tariffs and Trade 1947)."° In fact, the United States itself
became "the guiding force behind the adoption of TRIPS.""1
When TRIPS finally came to fruition, the international commu-
nity was pleased to see that it altered the focus of previous
deficient international conventions by swaying more towards
viewing intellectual property rights as a trade-related is-
sue."'
i
III. TRIPS
TRIPS provided a stricter international standard and more
detailed rules for the protection of intellectual property
rights."' TRIPS has been lauded by commentators as "the
highest expression to date of binding intellectual property law
in the international arena.""'
Particularly, TRIPS made significant substantive inclu-
sions in the realm of copyright piracy relating to music, where
the previous treaties were silent. First, TRIPS mandated con-
tinued adherence to the substantive principles of previous
major international intellectual property conventions, such as
the Berne Convention." In fact, the incorporation of Articles 1
through 21 of the Berne Convention into TRIPS has been
dubbed the "Berne plus" approach." 5 The substantive provi-
108. See Section 301, supra note 101, § 2411(c)(1).
109. See Saylor & Beton, supra note 80, at 13. See also David Nimmer, The
End of Copyright, 48 VAND. L. REv. 1385, 1390-1391 (1995) (providing an overview
of the drive of the United States to include intellectual property standards in the
Uruguay Round).
110. Nimmer, supra note 109, at 1391. See also GURNSEY, supra note 52, at 31
(describing the United States as "particularly anxious" to pinpoint intellectual
property rights as the central focus of the Uruguay Round of GATT negotiations).
111. See Saylor & Beton, supra note 80, at 12.
112. See LEAFFER, supra note 54, at 396.
113. Ninimer, supra note 109, at 1391-1392.
114. TRIPS, supra note 4, art. 9(1), at 1201.
115. See LEAFFER, supra note 54, at 396. See also Nimmer, supra note 109, at
BROOK. J. INTL L.
sions of the Rome Convention were not specifically incorporat-
ed into TRIPS, although Article 2(2) provided that the existing
obligations of members under that treaty still apply."' Inter-
estingly, even without expressly incorporating the Rome Con-
vention into TRIPS, its provisions concerning anti-bootlegging
in Article 14(1) mirror those in Article 7(1)(b) and 7(1)(c) of the
1961 Rome Convention."
7
After having solidified its foundation in the Berne Conven-
tion and other international conventions, TRIPS adds new
protections to areas where the Berne Convention remains
silent. For instance, Article 14 of TRIPS attempts to prevent
piracy, and bootlegging in particular, by protecting sound re-
cordings and live performances.'18 Specifically, with respect to
sound recordings, TRIPS provides that "[piroducers of
phonograms shall enjoy *the right to authorize or prohibit the
direct or indirect reproduction of their phonograms.""9 With
respect to live performances such as concerts, TRIPS provides
that "performers shall have the possibility of preventing the
following acts when undertaken without their authorization:
the fixation of their unfixed performance and the reproduction
of such fixation."2 ' The term "possibility of preventing" is of-
ten criticized for its absence of an explicit authorization for
artists to prohibit reproductions of their performances without
their consent.' The same language was previously used in
the Rome Convention due to concerns of music composers that
a performer might prevent a broadcast of a performance, there-
1392; Paul Katzenberger, TRIPS and Copyright Law, in FROM GATT TO
TRIPS-THE AGREEMENT ON TRADE-RELATED ASPECTS OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY
RIGHTS 59, 64-65 (Friedrich-Karl Beier & Gerhard Schricker eds., 1996) (discussing
the "Berne Plus" elements in TRIPS).
116. Rome Convention, supra note 12, art. 2(2).
117. See Peter Jaszi, Goodbye to All That-A Reluctant (And Perhaps Prema-
ture) Adieu to a Constitutionally-Grounded Discourse of Public Interest in Copyright
Law, 29 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 595, 601 (1996); Katzenberger, supra note 115, at
91. Nevertheless, the Rome Convention appears to be at least slightly broader
than TRIPS because where Article 14(1) of TRIPS only provides protection for fixa-
tions of a performance on a "phonogram," Article 7(1)(b) of the Rome Convention
provides rights for fixations on any "material support." See the discussion in IN-
TELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND INTERNATIONAL TRADE: THE TRIPS AGREEMENT 157
(Carlos M. Correa & Abdulqawi A. Yusuf eds., 1998).
118. TRIPS, supra note 4, art. 14.
119. Id. art. 14(2).
120. Id. art. 14(1).
121. See PATRY, supra note 78, at 7 n.23.
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by denying the composer the profits that might have been
made from the broadcast.'22 On the other hand, the language
has also been interpreted to allow members flexibility when
implementing the right in their own countries' laws. 23
Although TRIPS covered a lot of ground, its achievements
must be humbled by the fact that its success can only be mea-
sured by the continued efforts of member countries. Clearly,
with respect to pirated goods, TRIPS established a stricter
framework by which member countries of the WTO should
amend their own copyright laws. But TRIPS is only referred to
as a "framework" because it is not self-executing. 1" It is im-
portant to note that TRIPS is not a treaty, in this sense.2
Each member country need not instantaneously abide by the
provisions of TRIPS, rather, countries must "determine the
appropriate method of implementing the provisions of this
Agreement within their own legal system and practice."26 In
order to reap the benefits which TRIPS made possible, mem-
bers must remain committed to enhancing and enforcing intel-
lectual property rights within their own countries.'27 According-
ly, studied further in this Note are the steps taken by a notori-
ous intellectual property pirate, China,2 ' to implement the
substantive provisions of TRIPS into its own copyright system.
122. See id.
123. See DANIEL GERVAIS, THE TRIPS AGREEMENT DRAFTING HISTORY AND
ANALYSIS 96 (1998).
124. PATRY, supra note 78, at 3. As a general matter, a treaty which is en-
forceable by its terms, without prior implementation of the treaty by domestic
legislation of the signatories, is "self-executing." On the other hand, a "non-self-
executing" treaty requires that domestic legislation of the signatories be enacted to
make the treaty enforceable. For a discussion of "self-executing" versus "non-self-
executing" treaties, see INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND INTERNATIONAL TRADE, supra
note 117, at 118-20.
125. See Jaszi, supra note 117, at 602.
126. TRIPS, supra note 4, art. 1(1).
127. See Saylor & Beton, supra note 80, at 15 (explaining that "the commit-
ment to an improved system of international intellectual property protection and
enforcement must be retained if the potential benefits of the TRIPS Agreement are
to be fully realised").
128. China is not yet a member of the WTO, but strongly wishes to be. A
WTO Working Party was established to consider China's application for entry. See
WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION, 1997 ANNUAL REPORT 95.
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IV. CHINA: PROMISING PROGRESSION TOWARD ERADICATING
PIRACY
A close look at one specific country, China, will help illus-
trate how a previously infringing nation is now striving to
comply with TRIPS, and also how piracy is slowly expiring in
that country.
A. China's History Surrounding Copyright and Piracy
Throughout recent history, China has been deemed the
heart of "the world's largest pirate market,"'29 and also "the
biggest violator" of intellectual property rights. 3 ' However,
these negative attributes were only affixed to China when the
country was compared to Western nations. This practice, al-
though logical from a Western point of view, undermines and
diminishes the importance of understanding the culture in
which pirating activities were born.'3 ' Prior to the enactment
of China's first copyright statute in 1991,132 intellectual prop-
erty rights were not recognized at all. Piracy, in a technical
legal sense, did not exist.'33
China did not have a copyright law prior to 1991... and,
129. Tai, supra note 3, at 163.
130. Id. 162.
131. See William P. Alford, Making the World Safe For What? Intellectual Prop-
erty Rights, Human Rights and Foreign Economic Policy in the Post-European Cold
War World, 29 N.Y.U. J. INT' L. & POL. 135, 140-146 (1997) (criticizing the Unit-
ed States' attitude toward China as a "disturbing indifference both to the legacy of
China's past and the implications of its current political, legal, and economic cir-
cumstances").
132. Copyright Law of the People's Republic of China, adopted Sept. 7, 1990,
effective June 1, 1991, translated and reprinted in CHINA PAT. & TRADEMARKS,
Jan., 1991, at 65.
133. See Rengan, supra note 19, at 6.
134. China's original copyright statute was enacted in 1910, under the Qing
Dynasty. In 1949, the Communist Party formed the People's Republic of China,
and abolished that copyright law. Technically, the current copyright law is the
first of its kind in the history of the post-1949 People's Republic of China. For a
discussion of the history, see June Cohan Lazar, Note, Protecting Ideas and Ideals:
Copyright Law in the People's Republic of China, 27 LAW & POL'Y INT'L BUS.
1185, 1186 (1996); INTRODUCTION TO CHINESE LAW 441 (Wang Chenguang &
Zhang Xianchu eds., 1997); JAMES L. KENWORTHY, A GUIDE TO THE LAWS, REGU-
LATIONS AND POLICIES OF THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA ON FOREIGN TRADE
AND INVESTMENT 86 (1989). For a comparison of the assertion that China did not
have a copyright law prior to 1991 with the opinions of commentators who dis-
agree, arguing that although it was weak some protection did indeed exist, see
Zheng Chengsi, Chinese Copyright Law, in CHINESE FOREIGN ECONOMIC LAW:
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as noted earlier, barely understood the principles surrounding
intellectual property rights. China's current copyright law is
only a few years old, taking effect in 1991.' As one author
notes, "comparatively speaking China is a baby in the interna-
tional community of copyrights."' Considering the infancy of
the Chinese copyright system, and the societal considerations
arising from years of rule under the Communist regime which
affects the successful performance of these new copyright laws,
it is no wonder that piracy still thrives in China.'37 It is also
no wonder that China, holding deep-rooted beliefs in the Con-
fucian philosophy which traditionally abhorred litigation, has
trouble enforcing its judicial procedures in copyright enforce-
ment actions. 3'
The leadership under Mao Tse-tung and the Chinese Com-
munist Party in the early twentieth century also continues to
influence Chinese beliefs regarding intellectual property rights
today.3 9 Under Mao Tse-tung, property rights arising from
"products of the mind" were not recognized at all. 4 Owner-
ship, according to Chinese Communist beliefs, was a capitalist
concept, contradictory to selfless communist goals.' Thus, in
the face of changing ideals and fundamental beliefs, it is un-
derstandable that the Chinese government has difficulty en-
forcing copyright laws, and many Chinese pirates do not recog-
nize their actions as illegal.
Efforts to reconstruct its copyright system arose over the
ANALYSIS AND COMMENTARY 16-1 (Rui Mu & Wang Guiguo eds., 1990) (Supp. no. 3
1994).
135. See Copyright Law of the People's Republic of China, supra note 132, at
65.
136. Rengan Shen, Copyright Law in China, in 1 INTERNATIONAL INTELLECTUAL
PROPERTY LAW AND POLIcY 73, 77 (Hugh C. Hanson ed., 1996).
137. See Kenyon S. Jenckes, Note, Protection of Foreign Copyrights in China:
the Intellectual Property Courts and Alternative Avenues of Protection, 5 S. CAL.
INTERDISC. L.J. 551, 553 (1997).
138. Id. at 553-554.
139. See id. at 554 (explaining that "although Communism has had a signifi-
cant influence on the Chinese legal system, the modern system is a product of
both traditional culture and Maosim"); Julia Cheng, China's Copyright System:
Rising to the Spirit of TRIPS Requires an Internal Focus and WTO Membership,
21 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 1941, 1980 (1998) (discussing that "Maoist ideology exerted
a major impact on the shaping of the modern Chinese legal system").
140. Jenckes, supra note 137, at 556.
141. Id.
142. Id.
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years in large part due to the United States' threats of trade
sanctions against China under section 301 of the Trade
Act.'43 The United States thought that the possibility of a
trade war would be so unattractive that it would serve as in-
centive for China to reform its intellectual property
protections.4 Unfortunately, however, a cycle developed be-
tween the two countries wherein the United States made
threats of sanctions and China then enforced intellectual prop-
erty protections randomly and sporadically."5 In fact, the Unit-
ed States used its "Special 301" trade sanction threats against
China three times, in 1992, 1995, and 1996.' 46 Every one of
these threats resulted in China's acquiescence, as demon-
strated by signing trade agreements with the United States,
promising intellectual property protection in the future.
4 1
Eventually the United States became skeptical of any en-
forcement efforts on China's part, considering them as "token"
instances aimed simply at avoiding a trade war with the Unit-
ed States.'
41
The long-standing trade battles between the United States
and China arising out of China's intellectual property viola-
tions further culminated in threats from the United States to
restrict China's entry into the World Trade Organization
(WTO) as a founding member.'4 9 The relationship between
China and the United States illustrates the previous discus-
143. See Section 301, supra note 101, § 2411(a). See also Cheng, supra note
139, at 1964 (explaining the external pressures from countries such as the United
States, which affected China's copyright protection system).
144. See Helene Cooper & Kathy Chen, China's Textiles to Top U.S. Hit List of
Sanctions Aimed at Curbing Piracy, WALL ST. J., May 14, 1996, at A2 ("Threaten-
ing sanctions, the U.S. hopes, will push China to enforce its intellectual property
laws.").
145. See Cheng, supra note 139, at 1964.
146. See, e.g., Helene Cooper & Kathy Chen, Sanctions Put U.S., China On
Course to Trade War, WALL ST. J., Feb. 6, 1995, at A3; Helene Cooper & Kathy
Chen, U.S., China Deadlock in Copyright Talks, WALL ST. J., May 15, 1996, at
All. See also Cheng, supra note 139, at 1965-1966 (providing historical back-
ground of the ongoing intellectual property dispute between the United States and
China).
147. See generally Memorandum of Understanding on the Protection of Intellec-
tual Property, China-U.S., Jan. 17, 1992, 34 I.L.M. 676 [hereinafter 1992 MOU];
1995 IPR Agreement, supra note 15; 1996 IPR Agreement, supra note 15.
148. See generally Cooper & Chen, supra note 144, at A2 (quoting a U.S. offi-
cial as saying "the U.S. won't settle for a simple pledge from Beijing that isn't
accompanied by action").
149. See Nimmer, supra note 109, at 1386.
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sion regarding the effects of intellectual property piracy on
overall trade between developed and developing countries. The
possibility of debilitating trade wars and the denial of acces-
sion to the economy-boosting WTO were strong weapons in the
United States' arsenal used against China. In fact, China's
WTO membership was indeed denied due to the United States'
efforts, 5 ' resulting from China's seemingly lax and unchang-
ing attitude toward enforcement of intellectual property
rights.1
51
B. China's Copyright System
Although there are a small number of problems in China's
Copyright Law, on the whole it complies with the substantive
provisions of TRIPS.5 2 Article 14 of TRIPS is dealt with in
China's Copyright Law, which provides similar rights to per-
formers, producers of sound recordings, and broadcasters. 53
Specifically, Article 36 of the law provides performers with the
right to permit others to reproduce, distribute, or broadcast
their performance, and also to receive compensation in light of
the profit others may make from the use of their perfor-
mance.'54 Article 39 provides substantially the same right to
producers of sound recordings.1
55
There is, however, an inherent weakness in the language
of China's Copyright Law. The deficiency lies in the absence of
an express prohibition of unauthorized recordings and distribu-
150. See Helene Cooper & Kathy Chen, China Averts Trade War With the U.S.,
Promising a Campaign Against Piracy, WALL ST. J., Feb. 27, 1995, at A3 (naming
the United States as "the primary barrier to China's entry into the WTO"). It is
important to note that China, to date, has still not formally been invited for mem-
bership in the WTO. WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION, supra note 128, at 95. There-
fore, China is technically not under any obligation provided in TRIPS to bring its
copyright laws into compliance, although the desire to join the WTO propels
Chinas efforts to comply.
151. See generally Brown, supra note 3, at 13-15 (detailing the history of the
relationship between the United States and China in regards to intellectual prop-
erty violations).
152. In fact, one commentator argues that China's "areas of continuing non-
compliance with TRIPS are substantively minor." Michael Schlesinger, Intellectual
Property Law in China: Part I-Complying with TRIPS Requirements, E. ASIAN
EXEcUTWVE REP., Jan. 15, 1997, at 9, 15.
153. See Copyright Law of the People's Republic of China, supra note 132, arts.
35-44, at 68
154. Id. art. 36.
155. Id. art. 39.
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tions' 56 The law allows artists and producers the right to au-
thorize reproduction and distribution of their works, but does
not specifically suggest penalties for uses of the work without
the author's consent.'57 TRIPS grants authors the possibility of
preventing the unauthorized fixation of their performance. 8
Perhaps it is implied in the Chinese Copyright Law that if an
author can allow someone else to copy his work, he can also
prevent another person from copying it without his consent.
Although this loose language in the Chinese Copyright Law is
somewhat circular in respect to anti-piracy, the rights permit-
ting authors under the Chinese Copyright Law to authorize
reproductions of their works nevertheless complies with the
language in Article 14 of TRIPS."5 9
C. Further Efforts at Eradicating Piracy
In early 1992, China signed a bilateral agreement covering
intellectual property with the United States, called the 1992
Memorandum of Understanding on the Protection of Intellectu-
al Property Rights (1992 MOU). 60 The 1992 MOU is most
notable for its requirement that China must accede to the
Berne Convention.' 6 ' Additionally, the 1992 MOU ordered
China to amend its Copyright Law and issue new regulations
to comply with the Berne Convention. 6 2 Thus, China enacted
the Implementing International Copyright Treaties Provi-
sions 63 (ICT Provisions) to incorporate the Berne Convention
and the UCC into its laws, and also the Implementing Regula-
tions"M to add the 1992 MOU into its new Copyright Law.
Problems soon arose over the enforcement of these new
copyright regulations, as evidenced by China's inclusion on the
156. See Reiko R. Feaver, China's Copyright Law & the TRIPS Agreement, 5 J.
TRANSNAT'L L. & POL'Y 431, 448 (1996).
157. Copyright Law of the People's Republic of China, art. 10(5).
158. TRIPS, supra note 4, art. 14.
159. TRIPS, supra note 4, art. 14. For a discussion of TRIPS' requirements, see
supra Part III.
160. See generally 1992 MOU, supra note 147.
161. Id. art. 3(1).
162. Id. art. 3(4).
163. See Implementing International Copyright Treaties Provisions, effective
Sept. 30, 1992, translated in CHINA L. & PRAC., Jan. 14, 1993, at 36.
164. See Regulations for the Implementation of the Copyright Law of the
People's Republic of China, effective June 1, 1991, translated in CHINA CURRENT
L., Jan. 1991, at 5.
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Special 301 priority foreign countries list in 1994.165 So, in
order to avoid a massive trade war launched by the United
States, China signed an agreement in February of 1995, fur-
ther enhancing intellectual property protection. 166
The 1995 IPR Agreement established new provisions af-
fecting music piracy, and other related copyright infringe-
ments. First, it set up an agency called the Working Confer-
ence on Intellectual Property Rights to monitor the implemen-
tation of the copyright regulations and ensure that intellectual
property rights are being respected. 67 It also mandated the
cooperation of additional task forces at "sub-central levels" to
participate in enforcement. 18 Also, a six month special enforce-
ment period commenced on March 1, 1995, in order to intensify
the efforts at eliminating piracy, and increase the number of
investigations. 69 Article I(C)(4) of the 1995 IPR Agreement
further increases the raid on illegal CD production by calling
for unannounced inspections of all CD plants operating in
China during the special enforcement period.7 ° Additionally,
Article I(D) proposes intensified inspections for imported and
exported CDs, which would be subject to seizure, forfeiture, or
destruction if found to be infringing.1 ' Finally, and perhaps
most importantly, the 1995 IPR Agreement implements a
unique identification verification system, which requires that
all CD manufacturers conspicuously imprint their unique iden-
tifier on all CDs.' In addition, every legitimate CD manufac-
turer must have a proper title registration authorizing the
reproduction of copyrighted CDs.'73
Despite these lofty ideals set forth in the 1995 IPR Agree-
ment, the United States' opinion was that the agreement
165. See Cheng, supra note 139, at 1969.
166. See generally 1995 IPR Agreement, supra note 15. For a summary of the
agreement, see Tom Hope, A Victory For IPR?, ASIA L., March 1995, at 12.
167, See 1995 IPR Agreement, supra note 15, art. I(A).
168. Id. art. I(B). Cooperation among these task forces and the Working Con-
ference was implemented in order to "accommodate the Chinese government's inex-
perience in enforcing laws against economic crime." Jenckes, supra note 137, at
567.
169. See 1995 IPR Agreement, supra note 15, art. I(C).
170. Id. art. I(C)(4).
171. Id. art. I(D)(1).
172. Id. art. I(H)(1).
173. Id. art. I(H)(2). See also Cheng, supra note 139, at 1974 n.226 (explaining
the Source Identification Code (SID) process utilized in China).
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turned out to be largely ineffective."4 Illegal CD plants shut
down during the special enforcement period were later re-
opened.'75 In fact, while China agreed to increase investiga-
tions of twenty-nine generally pirating factories, the number of
illegal production facilities actually increased to thirty-one. 7
Pirate CD production figures even managed to double in the
six month special enforcement period.'77 Eventually, noncompli-
ance with the 1995 IPR Agreement on China's part led once
again to threats of trade sanctions, 7 ' and inclusion on the
Special 301 priority foreign country list.7 '
The Chinese promised to improve intellectual property
protection once again with the United States in a 1996 IPR
Agreement.' The agreements between the United States and
China in 1995 and 1996 are largely the same. The 1996 IPR
Agreement, in relation to CD production, called for the closure
of fifteen illegal CD production plants, confiscation of CD pro-
duction equipment used for illegal purposes, closure of six CD
distribution markets in South China's Guangdong province,
strengthened border surveillance, and twenty-four hour inspec-
tors at CD factories to police the use of the mandatory verifica-
tion system on all CDs.' An additional seven month enforce-
ment period would commence, as in 1995, and the Chinese
government would not allow any new CD plants to open for an
unspecified period.' In summary, the 1995 IPR Agreement is
revived in theory within the 1996 IPR Agreement, along with
the addition of a few new measures aimed at further eradi-
cating piracy.'83
174. See generally Cooper & Chen, supra note 144, at A2 (surveying industry
dissatisfaction with the 1995 IPR Agreement); Cheng, supra note 139, at 1973
(noting that "Chinese efforts to implement the [1995 IPR Agreement] were far
from adequate").
175. See Cheng, supra note 139, at 1973.
176. See Cooper & Chen, supra note 144, at A2.
177. See Maggie Farley & James Gerstenzang, China Piracy of U.S. Products
Surges Despite Accord, L.A. TIMES, Oct. 10, 1995, at Al.
178. See generally Cooper & Chen, supra note 144, at A2.
179. See Executive Briefing-China-U.S.: Intellectual Property Rights, E. ASIAN
EXECUTIVE REP., Apr. 15, 1996, at 4.
180. See generally 1996 IPR Agreement, supra note 15.
181. See Kathy Chen & Helene Cooper, U.S. and China Reach an Agreement,
Averting Trade Sanctions on Both Sides, WALL ST. J., June 18, 1996, at A2; Tan
Loke-Khoon & Jennifer Freidenrich, Asia Pacific Review of the Year: China, COPY-
RIGHT WORLD, Feb. 1997, at 19, 20.
182. See 1996 IPR Agreement, supra note 15.
183. See Cheng, supra note 139, at 1976 (explaining that the 1996 IPR Agree-
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The 1996 IPR Agreement was initially met with significant
criticism and skepticism from music and related entertainment
industry leaders for its resemblance to the failed 1995 IPR
Agreement." 4 Even though these concerns were clearly justi-
fied in light of the 1995 Agreement's shortcomings, the Chinese
government has made substantial steps towards progress re-
garding enforcement.'85 In fact, it has even been noted that
"[t]he general consensus is that the Chinese authorities have
shown steady progress in enforcing the 1996 IPR Agree-
ment."'8 6 As a result, in 1997 the International Intellectual
Property Alliance (IIPA), an independent agency, conducted its
own annual "Special 301" review of the world-wide piracy prob-
lem, in order to submit recommendations to the USTR.187 In
collaboration with the RIAA, the IIPA's recommendation to the
USTR was to "closely monitor developments in the People's
Republic of China."'8 Although this language may sound
negative, the IIPA did couple this warning with sincere praise
of China by commenting favorably on China's solid attempts to
shut down illegal counterfeit CD plants.'8 9
In the years following the 1996 IPR Agreement, the con-
tinning efforts of the Chinese government to amend and en-
force its laws in hope of gaining entry into the WTO were rec-
ognized by the USTR. 9 ° In her 1998 Special 301 review, the
USTR acknowledged that "[b]ased on the 1995 and 1996 Bilat-
eral IPR Agreements and extensive follow-up work with Chi-
nese officials, China now has a functioning system to protect
intellectual property rights."'9' The USTR therefore ordered
that China be monitored under Section 306 of the Trade
Act,'9 which meant that she could move immediately to
ment "reiterates provisions of the 1995 [IPR Agreement] and adds more promises
to keep up the fight against copyright piracy").
184. See Chen & Cooper, supra note 181, at A2 (quoting Michael Johnson,
president of Buena Vista Home Entertainment, as saying "We did this drill in
1995 .... [t]he question is 'is this for real or not?'").
185. See Cheng, supra note 139, at 1976.
186. Loke-Khoon & Freidenrich, supra note 181, at 21, 24.
187. United States: '301' Special Reviews, COPYRIGHT WORLD, Apr. 1997, at 10.
188. Id. at 10, 11.
189. See id.
190. See USTR Launches Attack on Greece, Cites Other Countries in Special
301 Report, supra note 102, at 196.
191. Id.
192. Section 301, supra note 101, § 2416; Special 301 Decisions, supra note
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trade sanctions if she "detects slippage in China's enforcement
of bilateral intellectual property rights agreements."9 ' Some
Chinese officials were disappointed by China's inclusion under
the Section 306 monitoring provision because it subjects China
to continued scrutiny."" Others, however, viewed China's ab-
sence from the priority foreign country list, or even the watch
list, as a victory.'95
As a further measure toward eradicating piracy, China
revised its criminal law in 1997 to include intellectual property
infringement as a class of punishment.'96 China's Criminal
Law is more explicit than its Copyright Law with regard to its
prohibition of music piracy.'97 It imposes punishment for unau-
thorized reproductions or distributions of musical works of
both the copyright owners and the phonogram producers.' 98
The law explains that "infringement of copyright... for the
purpose of obtaining profit"'99 or "knowingly selling infring-
ing reproductions of specified copyright materials for the pur-
pose of obtaining profit""9 is prohibited. Also, in cases where
the individual infringer's profits are "exceptionally large" (ex-
ceeding approximately $12,500 United States dollars), he is
also punishable under Article 218 for sales of infringing cop-
ies. O' Additionally, criminal liability also gives rise to pay-
ment of compensatory damages to the injured copyright owners
involved.2"2 Finally, the crime warrants from three to seven
years imprisonment, depending upon the amount of the
105, at 8.
193. USTR Launches Attack on Greece, Cites Other Countries in Special 301
Report, supra note 102, at 188.
194. See China Vows to Beef Up Protection in Response to USTR Designation,
WoRLD INTELL. PROP. REP., June 1998, at 178.
195. See Steve Mufson, Piracy Still Runs Rampant in China; Yet Industries
Oppose Asking For Sanctions, WASH. POST, Mar. 27, 1998, at E03 (quoting U.S.
officials and industry members as optimistic towards China's efforts: "There are
still things we'd like to see done, but we're moving in the right direction").
196. See Revised Criminal Law of the People's Republic of China, effective Oct.
1, 1997, arts. 213-220, translated in CHINA L. & PRAC., June 1997, at 39, 43. For
a helpful summary of the Revised Criminal Law, see Chen Meizhang, New Moves
Towards the Protection of Intellectual Property in China, CHINA PAT. & TRADE-
MARKS, Oct. 1997, at 11.
197. For a discussion of China's Copyright Law, see supra Part IV.B.
198. See Meizhang, supra note 196, at 11.
199. Revised Criminal Law of the People's Republic of China, art. 217.
200. Id. art. 218; Loke-Khoon & Freidenrich, supra note 181, at 21, 22.
201. Revised Criminal Law of the People's Republic of China, art. 218.
202. Id.
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infringer's income derived from his illegal act, or other serious
circumstances."' Until the Criminal Law was revised in 1997,
Chinese "legislation did not authorize resort to criminal pun-
ishment for even the most outrageous copyright violations."0 4
Thus, this development illustrates a step in the direction to-
ward holding pirates not only liable under civil law for their
violations, but also under criminal law.
One of the most severe sanctions in the history of China's
new copyright regime since the 1996 IPR Agreement, and the
newly-revised Criminal Law, prohibiting copyright theft was
declared in 1997.05 On December 6, 1997, three CD pirates
were sentenced to life imprisonment for possession of 383,000
pirated CDs, which the criminals intended to smuggle into
nearby Hong Kong.0 6 This decision of the Chinese People's
Court in South China's Guangdong province illustrates that
the government is working painstakingly to enforce the 1996
IPR Agreement, and is ordering criminal punishment to deter
illegal pirating behavior.
Additional efforts to enforce intellectual property rights
and wipe out piracy in the past few years have been monumen-
tally successful. The increase in raids and seizures of CD pro-
duction equipment, and the arising incidence of intellectual
property infringement civil cases demonstrate the effectiveness
of the copyright regime as a whole.0 7 According to the RIAA,
following the 1996 Special 301 review and the resulting 1996
IPR Agreement, Chinese officials stepped up pirate CD plant
raids and seizures so that pirate CD production and export
figures had dropped significantly by January 1997.0 Chinese
officials report that, throughout the remainder of 1997, nearly
40 underground pirate CD factories were closed and customs
border raids had resulted in the seizure of a wealth of CD
203. See Meizhang, supra note 196, at 11.
204. Jerome A. Cohen, Enforcement of Intellectual Property Rights in Asia: the
Case of China, in INTERNATIONAL INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW & POLICY 63, 65
(Hugh C. Hanson ed., 1996).
205. See Loke-Khoon & Friederich, supra note 181, at 21, 23.
206. See id.; Sentence of Life Imprisonment For CD Piracy Is Harshest So Far,
WORLD INTELL. PROP. REP., Jan. 1998, at 4.
207. See Loke-Khoon & Freiderich, supra note 181, at 21. "The Supreme
People's Court recently announced that between January 1996 and May 1997,
courts across the country handled up to 5,296 IPR civil cases, 10 percent of which
concerned overseas parties." Id. at 24.
208. See RIAA 1997 ANN. REP., supra note 37, at 27.
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equipment. 2°9 As a result, approximately 250 pirates were
arrested and convicted, thanks to the strict enforcement of the
revised Criminal Law.210 In the words of the Commissioner of
the Chinese Patent Office, "although China has had a late
start, it has made rapid progress through its own energetic
efforts and international cooperation"' regarding intellectu-
al property protection as a whole.
Numerous legal scholars have theorized that "the integra-
tion of China into the WTO and China's consequent adherence
to the TRIPS agreement may be the best means of ensuring
fiture improvements."2 2 Indeed, admitting China into the
WTO would likely result in long-term benefits.21 ' The United
States would no longer need to rely on unilateral actions, such
as threats of trade sanctions, to force China to comply. Instead,
multilateral action under WTO Dispute Settlement mecha-
nisms would prove to be more effective in dealing with China's
violations. Also, as China develops status as an emerging
world power, many commentators and analysts feel it is wise
to grant China leeway so that it does not become resentful
toward the United States.21 4 Such resentment could later be
problematic when China's economy rises to a level commensu-
rate with the United State's or other Western powers.
Upon analysis of the 1996 IPR Agreement and other relat-
ed legislation affecting piracy, it is evident that "China's legis-
lation for the protection of intellectual property is now relative-
ly complete."215 China is also currently undergoing an amend-
ment to its Copyright Law,16 the results of which will hopeful-
ly bring China into an even more favorable position regarding
209. See Loke-Khoon & Friederich, supra note 181, at 21, 24.
210. Id. at 24.
211. Gao Lulin, China and the TRIPS Agreement, CHINA PAT. & TRADEMARKS,
Jan. 1997, at 5, 6.
212. Feaver, supra note 156, at 433. See also Cheng, supra note 139, at 2005
(suggesting that "[aidmitting China into the WTO will encourage China to enforce
its copyright protection and enhance the international community's position to
contain China's piracy problem").
213. See Lazar, supra note 134, at 1211; Schlesinger, supra note 152, at 16;
Feaver, supra note 156, at 433.
214. See Lazar, supra note 134, at 1209-1211. "It could prove disastrous to
keep China out of the WTO, especially if China decides in twenty years to use its
new economic power to unilaterally threaten the United States." Id. at 1211.
215. Loke-Khoon & Freidenrich, supra note 181, at 22.
216. See Meizhang, supra note 196, at 12.
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TRIPS compliance. While it is obvious that the fight against
piracy is nowhere near finished in China, significant steps
have been taken to enforce intellectual property rights and
stomp out piracy. These strenuous efforts have resulted in
measured success. China may not always be functioning at a
level consistent with the United States' demands, but com-
pared to its history it has accomplished a great deal. Hopeful-
ly, continued efforts will accelerate intellectual property protec-
tion, thereby making it unnecessary for the United States to
threaten trade sanctions or monitor China under Special 301
provisions at all.
V. IMPROVED CD COPYING TECHNOLOGY THREATENS TO
UNDERMINE EFFORTS AT COMPLIANCE WITH TRIPS
Throughout the years prior to the surfacing of the CD-
Recordable disc and the CD-Rewritable disc, 11 it was theo-
rized that new technology for copying sound recordings would
disrupt legitimate sales and increase the strength of the pirate
market.21 Today that concern is slowly proving itself true.
The RIAA believes that the historically feared concept of
"large-scale digital piracy has begun to assert itself," 9 most-
ly due to the threat posed by easy access to cheap CD copying
equipment. The latest technology is the CD-R, recently intro-
duced in 1997, and commonly known as a "burner" because
lasers from the CD-R machine burn information onto the CD-R
disc.2 CD-Rs are becoming increasingly less expensive, as the
device itself can be purchased for around three hundred to four
hundred dollars, and the blank CD-R discs cost about one
dollar. 1 As evidence of the rapidly increasing availability of
217. A CD-Rewritable disc (CD-RW) can have sounds copied onto it over and
over again, in contrast to the CD-R which can only be copied to once. See Alpert,
supra note 82, at 50, 52.
218. See Schwartz, supra note 25, at 613.
219. Holland, supra note 43, at 5.
220. See RIAA 1997 ANN. REP., supra note 37, at 35; CD Piracy Continues to
Raise Questions, SEATTLE TIMES, Aug. 16, 1998, at C4, available in 1998 WL
3167406.
221. See RIAA 1997 ANN. REP., supra note 37, at 35; See also Doug Reece,
Sharp Jump Reported in CD-R Piracy, BILLBOARD, Sept. 5, 1998, at 12, available
in 1998 WL 10914762 (pricing CD-R drives at $300, and CD-R discs at $1 each);
Stephen Nathans, Sound to Burn: Audio Recording Tools For CD-R, EMEDIA
PROF., Feb. 1, 1998, at 46, available in 1998 WL 9595592.
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CD-Rs on the market, a CD-R plant estimated to have pro-
duced an astounding nineteen million dollars worth of pirated
CDs was raided on May 5, 1998.2 The raid of the New York
plant, which resulted in forty-three arrests and closed down
the largest CD-R factory ever, opened the eyes of the music
industry to the problem of CD-Rs.223
Indeed the RIAA has acknowledged this growing problem,
and is working diligently to ensure that this new CD-R tech-
nology is not used for illegal purposes. The RIAA's stated goals
(among many) are to "promote strong intellectual property
protection and effective enforcement nationally and interna-
tionally; combat record piracy; ... [and] meet the challenges of
technology."21 Members and leaders of the RIAA are hesitant
to accept these new products without hesitation.
Industry leaders, while appreciating the monumental ad-
vancements in sound recording technology, cannot ignore the
ramifications it undoubtedly will have on copyright protection.
They seem torn between lauding the accomplishments of the
consumer electronics industry who invent and market these
devices, and reprimanding them for creating new avenues in
the pirate market. For instance, Hilary Rosen, president and
CEO of the RIAA, suggests that "[r]ather than feel threatened
by the changes that come with technological advancement, we
can welcome the role of progress."2' On the other hand, the
RIAA on the whole is much less positive than its president and
CEO. David Stebbings, senior vice president of technology at
the RIAA, notes that "[t]he growth and speed of developing
technology has made it difficult to develop and implement
protection standards." 6 Stebbings admits that technology in
the realm of music is an outstanding achievement, but he
counters that praise with trepidation over whether copyright
protection technology (to thwart pirating activity) will be incor-
porated into these new recording devices. 27 Additionally, en-
tertainment industry members are concerned that copying may
be depriving artists of some revenue because it indirectly di-
222. See John Lannert, RIAA Piracy Raids Highlight CD-R Concerns, BILL-
BOARD, May 23, 1998, at 8, available in 1998 WL 10913358.
223. See id.
224. RIAA 1997 ANN. REP., supra note 37, at cover (1998).
225. Id. at 5.
226. Id. at 17.
227. See id.
[Vol. XXV:2476
1999] ANTI-PIRACY EFFORTS UNDER TRIPS
ishes the financial success of any compilation they may later
release."'
Nevertheless, the RIAA only reflects one faction in the
dispute. In strong contrast, proponents of sound recording
technology discount the effects on piracy as minimal, and actu-
ally see new copying technology as a boost to the music mar-
ket. 2 9 Supporters of technological advancement argue that al-
lowing people to copy CDs and disseminate the music to a
larger audience will result in an increased demand for the
recording artist's work. 30 Gary Shapiro, president of the Con-
sumer Electronics Manufacturers Association, complains that
new technology has continually been opposed by all performing
arts industries, even though "every one of those technologies
has made them money.""
Additionally, most supporters of the CD-R take the view
that consumers have a right to copy music which they legally
own onto a CD-R for their own personal use."' Although they
acknowledge the importance of the anti-piracy campaign, these
supporters of the copying technology do not agree that all use
of CD-Rs constitutes copyright infringement."3 Permitting
music-loving consumers to coordinate their own compilations of
CDs they own is considered a perfectly legal activity, according
to the developers of the CD-RY 4 As Jonathan Thompson, vice
president of the Consumer Electronics Manufacturers Associa-
tion suggests, "[tihere is nothing wrong with having this equip-
ment for legitimate, in-home use." 5
This argument is based on the Audio Home Recording Act
228. See Wiley, supra note 1, at 11 (quoting the RIAA as maintaining that
"with consumers making their own music compilations and mixes, record compa-
nies and artists lose a portion of potential sales of their own products").
229. See CD Piracy Continues to Raise Question, supra note 220, at C4 (ex-
plaining that the supporters of the CD-R view the technology as providing an
increased demand for the work of recording artists).
230. See id.
231. Id.
232. See Wiley, supra note 1, at 11.
233. See id (quoting an industry vice president as declaring that CD-R "burn-
ing for pleasure and not for profit is not a crime").
234. See id. (quoting the president of the Consumer Electronics Manufacturers
Association as saying that "almost nobody buys a CD with a whole bunch of songs
and likes every song. People like to put their own combinations together").
235. Wiley, supra note 1, at 11.
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of 1992 (AHRA)," which permits consumers to use a "digital
audio recording device," like the CD-R drive, to make copies of
their favorite music for their own noncommercial use.237 Sec-
tion 1008 of the AHRA provides that
[n]o action may be brought under this title [Copyright Act]
based on the manufacture, importation, or distribution of a
digital audio recording device, a digital audio recording medi-
um, an analog recording device, or an analog recording medi-
um, or based on the noncommercial use by a consumer of
such a device or medium for making digital musical record-
ings or analog musical recordings.
Much to the RIAA's dissatisfaction, the AHRA clearly does not
prohibit the sale or manufacture of devices like the CD-R,239
even though they could conceivably be used for infringing pur-
poses. The CD-R and its relative the CD-RW have been argu-
ably constructed in compliance with the AHRA.20 According to
the AHRA, a "digital audio recording device" is any type of
machine designed to facilitate copying "for private use" by indi-
viduals."' The Act emphasizes that the primary purpose of the
device should be for private use, and that it should be "com-
monly distributed to individuals for use by individuals.""
The CD-R is presumptively designed for in-home use by con-
sumers who are copying their favorite tracks, not intending to
resell them. Thus it fits the criteria set forth in the AHRA,
absolving its manufacturers of any responsibilities the RIAA
believes they owe to recording artists.
Proponents of CD-R technology also rely heavily on the
Supreme Court's decision in Sony Corp. of America v. Univer-
sal City Studios, Inc., 243 in order to support their argument
that CD-Rs and related home recording technology are perfect-
ly legal. In that case, Sony developed and manufactured the
236. Audio Home Recording Act of 1992, 17 U.S.C. § 1008 (1992).
237. Id.
238. Id.
239. Id.
240. See Robert A. Starrett, Copying Music to CD: the Right, the Wrong, and
the Law, EMEDIA PROF., Feb. 1, 1998, at 36, available in 1998 WL 9595590.
241. Audio Home Recording Act of 1992, § 1001.
242. Id.
243. Sony Corp. of America v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417
(1984). This decision is commonly referred to as the "Betamax" case. See Starrett,
supra note 240, at 36.
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Betamax video tape recorder for home taping of television
programs.2 Universal City Studios and Walt Disney, owners
of the copyrights in certain broadcast television programs, sued
Sony, alleging that taping a television program to be watched
at a later date violated their respective copyrights in the televi-
sion programs." This practice, dubbed "time shifting," 6
was alleged by Universal and Disney to be a copyright in-
fringement, which subjected Sony to contributory copyright
infringement for the sale of the Betamax recorder to the pub-
lic." v The Supreme Court disagreed with the complainants,
holding that "time shifting for private home use must be char-
acterized as a noncommercial, nonprofit activity" 8 which
does not constitute infringement. The Court supposes that "[ilf
Betamax were used to make copies for a commercial or profit-
making purpose, such use would presumptively be unfair."249
Additionally, the Court found it persuasive that the copying
involved had no effect on the market for the copyrighted
work." The Court explained that a "use that has no demon-
strable effect upon the potential market for, or the value of,
the copyrighted work need not be prohibited in order to protect
the author's incentive to create."2 1
Supporters of copying technology, although acknowledging
that the Betamax case involved video copying, believe that the
decision fits squarely with the audio copying issue at hand.252
They maintain that home CD copying has only a slight effect
on the recording industry,253 precluding it from being prohibit-
ed as an infringement. Additionally, technology supporters
believe that shifting the order of songs on one CD to a CD-R is
analogous to time shifting, as done by users in the Betamax
case.254 Furthermore, one member of the Consumer Electronics
Manufacturers Association suggests that since the sale and
244. See Sony, 464 U.S. at 417.
245. See id.
246. Id. at 418.
247. See id. at 420.
248. Id. at 449.
249. Id. at 449.
250. See Sony, 464 U.S. at 450.
251. Id.
252. See Wiley, supra note 1, at 11.
253. Id.
254. See Starrett, supra note 240, at 36.
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production of CD-R burners is not an infringement, the RIAA
should be more concerned with the truly infringing activities of
pirates.2
55
On the other side of the dispute, the RIAA would like to
see copyright protection technology utilized to counter the
possible negative implications of CD copying equipment.5 6
The RIAA has a difficult time swallowing the idea that the use
of CD-Rs is unregulated and unmonitored once it is sold to a
consumer. Electronics industry members have tried to assuage
this concern by installing a Serial Copy Management System
(SCMS) chip into CD burners as an anti-piracy measure."
The chip "encodes each [CD-R] disc after a recording so that a
digital copy of its content cannot be made."258 In short, if the
SCMS chip is in place, a pirate cannot use his first CD-R copy
as a 'master' to produce additional pirated copies. Although
this is a commendable effort on the part of the electronics
industry, it does not take into account that a pirate can copy
the original copyrighted, legitimate CD onto an infinite num-
ber of CD-Rs without ever encountering any trouble with the
SCMS chip. 9 As an alternative method, the RIAA itself sug-
gests "the use of embedded signals or watermarks buried inau-
dibly in audio....to control and regulate copying and unautho-
rized distribution of recordings."260
While the debate over the ills of technology rages on, the
statistics further help unmask the problem. Figures derived
from the RIAA's seizures clearly demonstrate the burst of CD-
Rs on the pirate scene. Since the introduction of the CD-R,
there were 87 counterfeit and pirate CD-Rs confiscated by the
RIAA in 1997,261 and the figure had grown enormously to 23,
858 by the RIAA's 1998 Mid-Year Anti-Piracy Statistics re-
leased on August 21, 1998.262 Apparently, this notable increase
255. See Wiley, supra note 1, at 11 (quoting Jonathan Thompson, vice president
of the Consumer Electronics Manufacturers Association as maintaining that "[the
equipment is not the problem. What's dangerous here is the behavior of the peo-
ple. Go after these people and punish them.").
256. See generally RIAA 1997 ANN. REP., supra note 37, at 17.
257. See Nathans, supra note 221, at 46.
258. Id.
259. See id.
260. RIAA 1997 ANN. REP., supra note 37, at 17.
261. Id. at 35.
262. 1998 Mid-Year Statistics, supra note 39. See Mid-year RIAA Figures Show
Alarming Rise in CD-R Piracy, ONE To ONE, Sept. 1, 1998, at 20, available in
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in such a short period of time reflects that the general CD
format is still widely popular, the 'burners' and CD-R discs
have decreased to an affordable price, and production is quite a
simple task.263 Given that the increase in pirate CD-R seizures
only reflects the RIAA's actual confiscation of such infringing
CD-Rs, it would be incorrect to assume that these figures are
an accurate assessment of the true number of CD-Rs on the
market. Indeed, it is safe to say that there is a wealth of illegal
CD-Rs still out there.
VI. CONCLUSION
Home recording rights do not violate Article 14 of TRIPS
in a broad sense because the copying involved in the ARRA is
presumptively done only on a personal, non-commercial level.
Therefore, TRIPS's fundamental objective of abolishing piracy
is not thwarted when individual consumers rearrange and copy
their own favorite CDs onto CD-Rs. It is when copying becomes
large-scale that problems arise. Because there is no way to
ensure that consumers will not be tempted to set up their own
small-scale pirating operation, there is also no way to know for
sure that CD-Rs will not inevitably pose a threat to the objec-
tives of TRIPS. In fact, it seems that there is a strong possibili-
ty that CD-Rs will contribute to activities which TRIPS prohib-
its.
These new copying devices are certain to make their way
into international trade. Considering that United States feder-
al and judicial law both permit copying on an individual basis,
these CD-R burners and discs are sure to remain on the mar-
ket here and abroad whether or not they contain sufficient
copyright protection technology, as suggested by the RIAA.
Given the indifferent attitude that some nations have tradi-
tionally had towards intellectual property protection, foreign
governments will suffer setbacks when the CD-R arrives on
their soil. Countries struggling to stomp out piracy will once
again need to assess their laws to consider how CD-Rs affect
1998 WL 10068235; Reece, supra note 221, at 12.
263. See Reece, supra note 221, at 12 (theorizing that the crackdown on large-
scale CD factories has forced some pirates to less risky venues, and that the ease
of recording with CD-Rs facilitates these moves). "The obvious answer from pirates
has been, 'I can set up my own CD factory in my kitchen.'" Id.
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copyright protections under their respective copyright system.
Nations like China, for example, could encounter massive diffi-
culty when the CD-R boom hits its pirate market. Successful
efforts to keep enforcement of intellectual property rights up to
TRIPS's standards will undoubtedly be negatively impacted by
the introduction of the new and affordable technology of the
CD-R onto the pirate music scene. Reconciling these two com-
peting interests will be a monumental task.
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